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THE DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF PARENTAL
LIABILITY FOR THE TORTS OF MINORS
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold stormed Colum-
bine, Colorado high school armed with sawed off shotguns and bombs,
and in the ensuing madness they killed twelve students and a teacher,
wounded twenty-three other students, and took their own lives.1 This
massacre has been considered the deadliest school shooting in United
States history. 2 The aftermath of such a tragedy creates feelings of
sorrow and anger and raises questions of responsibility. 3 There are at
least eighteen lawsuits as a result of the massacre, with numerous parties
named as defendants. 4 In particular, parents of some of the victims have
filed suit against the parents of the shooters, alleging that the parents
failed to take action while their children stockpiled guns and bombs and
that they gave their children extraordinary privileges.5 Such parental
liability is the topic of this Note.
The issue of parental liability raises questions about who should
take the blame in the aftermath of tragedies such as the Columbine
massacre. 6 It is common to blame parents for their child's wrongdoing. 7
However, responsible parents may have a disturbed criminal child, while
neglectful parents may have a perfectly healthy child.8 Therefore, deter-
mining parental liability may require addressing parental responsibility
while also recognizing a child's inherited predisposition as well as peer
1. See Robert Weller, Columbine High School Shootings: School Massacre Spawns Lawsuits, SAN
DIEGO UNION AND Thm., Oct. 20, 1999, at A2.
2. See id.
3. See generally Court Decisions, Second Judicial Department, U.S. District Court: S.D.N. Y., 222
N.Y.L.J. 5 (1999) [hereinafter Court Decisions] (suggesting that the tragedy at Columbine has created
significant legal repercussions).
4. See Weller, supra note 1, at A2 (explaining that lawsuits are developing that target a variety of
potential defendants, including gunmakers, the shooters' parents, the school district, and the sheriffs
department).
5. See Weller, supra note 1, at A2; see also Court Decisions, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the
Harrises and the Klebolds allowed their children to "amass a cache of weapons in their home;
associate with each other even after they were caught together breaking into a van; and author
extremist and hateful writings").
6. See Valerie Finholm, Seeking a Delicate Balance as Parents, HARTFORD COURANT, May 3,
1999, at B5.
7. See generally id.
8. See id. (quoting from clinical psychologist Don Hiebel).
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and societal influences. 9 This Note highlights both parental responsi-
bility and children's predisposition for violence and examines their
effects on parental liability.
There are three major stages in the development of the law with
respect to parental liability.' 0 The first stage is the traditional common
law premise that parents are not liable for the acts of their minor chil-
dren.ll The second stage is an exception to the common law tradition,
enumerated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, which
holds parents liable, in certain circumstances, for the torts of their minor
children.1 2 The third stage is the enactment of state statutes that impose
liability upon parents for the willful, malicious, or intentional acts of the
parents' minor children.13 This Note examines each stage separately
and explores the current status of parental liability, focusing specifically
on North Dakota case law and parental liability statutes.
Section II of this Note discusses the common law tradition that
parents are not liable for the torts of their minor children. Section III re-
views the Restatement exception to the common law notion and analyzes
how this exception is applied. Section IV explores parental liability
statutes by analyzing the constitutionality of such statutes, examining the
general form of parental liability statutes, and analyzing the extent of
liability imposed by such statutes. This Note concludes by examining
how the common law, the Restatement, and parental liability statutes
likely affect North Dakota.
II. COMMON LAW TRADITION
The common law tradition asserted the premise that a mere parent-
child relationship was not sufficient grounds for liability, meaning
parents were not held liable for the torts of their minor children. 14 This
9. See id. (explaining that parental responsibility is a significant factor in controlling minor
children while also recognizing that other factors of a child's personality may cause him or her to
commit crimes).
10. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 116 (1987) (discussing the common law tradition, the
Restatement, and case law development of parental liability).
11. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 116 n.96 (citing cases).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) (imposing a parental duty to control one's
minor child and to prevent the child from intentionally harming others). The "certain circumstances"
to which the Second Restatement refers are as follows:
a) When the parent knows or has reason to know he has the ability to control his child;
and
b) When the parent knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
Id.
13. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 123 n.46 (citing cases from the following states which
have enacted parental liability statutes: Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas).
14. See 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 116. Reflecting the age of this notion, the common
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tradition has deep historical roots. 15 The common law notion existed in
the Dakota Revised Codes as early as 1877.16 This common law notion
is now codified in North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-21.17 As
early as 1929, the North Dakota Supreme Court explained in Millerv.
Kraftl8 that parents are not answerable for the acts of their child. 19 Thus,
the father in Miller could not be held liable for damages caused by his
child's negligent use of an automobile unless the child was using the
vehicle in the father's business. 20
Thirty-seven years later, the North Dakota Supreme Court again
entertained the notion that parents are not liable for the acts of their
minor children. 21 Interestingly, the court recognized that, based on a
child's act, parents may be liable due to their own negligence.22 How-
ever, the court suggested that parental liability arose only when the par-
ents' negligence made it possible and probable for the child to cause the
injury. 23
Nearly every state has recognized in its common law that parents are
not liable for the acts of their minor children, 24 and both Oklahoma and
South Dakota have enacted statutes abrogating parental liability. 25 How-
ever, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has also recognized that despite the
fact that parents are not answerable for the acts of their child, parents
may be held liable for their own negligence. 26 This is true for most
law tradition was that paternity was not sufficient grounds for liability. See id; see also Winterom v.
Rybicki, 397 N.E.2d 485, 487 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that parents are not liable for the torts of
their minor child merely because of the parent-child relationship);White v. Seitz, 174 N.E. 371, 372
(Il1. 1930) (stating accordance with the universal rule of the common law, that a parent is not liable for
the tort of his or her minor child merely because of the relationship).
15. See Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
One of the more inscrutable holdovers from the ancient establishments of the common
law is the historically ubiquitous idea that a parent who has visited upon the world a
tort-inflicting child ought not to be held financially responsible for the torts that the child
has in turn visited upon those of us unfortunate enough to have gotten in the way.
Id.
16. See DAKOTA REVISED CODES § 105, at 222 (1877) ("IN]either parent nor child is answerable,
as such, for the act of the other").
17. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21 (1997) ("[N]either parent nor child is answerable as such
for the act of the other").
18. 223 N.W. 190 (N.D. 1929).
19. See Miller v. Kraft, 223 N.W. 190, 191 (N.D. 1929) ("[U]nder section 4439, C. L. 1913,
neither parent nor child is answerable as such for the act of the other").
20. See id. "The liability of the owner of a motor vehicle for damages caused by the negligent
operation thereof by another rests upon the doctrine of agency express or implied." Id.
21. See Peterson v. Rude, 146 N.W.2d 555, 557 (N.D. 1966).
22. See id. A parent still may be held liable for his or her child's acts if the parent had knowl-
edge that the child has committed previous acts of the same character and the parent failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent the child from committing the similar act which caused the injury. See id.
23. See id.
24. See 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 116 n.96 (citing cases).
25. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 20 (1998) ("[N]either parent nor child is answerable, as such, for
the act of the other"); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-14 (Michie 1999) ("[N]either parent nor
child is answerable as such, for the act of the other").
26. See Sawyer v. Kelly, 153 P.2d 97, 98-99 (Okla. 1944). "That the parent of a minor child may
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
courts applying the principle that parents are not liable for the acts of
their minor children, many of which have found an exception predicated
upon parental negligence. 27 This parental negligence exception is most
often based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316.28
III. RESTATEMENT EXCEPTION TO THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION
Over the years, the common law standard of parental liability for the
acts of their minor children has been revisited and modified. 29 Four
exceptions to the common law notion that parents are not liable for
the acts of their minor children have developed. 30 However, this Note is
specifically concerned with only one of those four exceptions: that par-
ents may be liable for the acts of their minor children when the parents
fail to exercise control over their minor child.31 Today, many states
follow this exception and, through the application of a test established in
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, hold parents liable if they
fail to control the conduct of their minor children. 32 Liability under the
Restatement is predicated upon parental negligence 33 and is delineated in
a two-part test.
be called on to respond for his own negligence in permitting the child to so something which the parent
as a reasonably prudent person should know might be dangerous is well settled." Id. at 99.
27. See Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528, 533-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see also Basler v. Webb,
544 N.E.2d 60, 62 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (explaining that section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
represents an exception to the rule that parents are not liable for the torts of their child).
28. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534.
29. See Parson v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ariz. 1973). "At common law it is well
established that mere parental relationship will not impose liability upon the parents for the torts of
their children .... But there have evolved in the law a few doctrines which impose liability upon the
parents for their children's torts." Id.
30. See Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
There are four common law exceptions to the general rule that a parent is not liable for
the tortious acts of her child: 1) where the parent entrusts the child with an instrumen-
tality which, because of the child's lack of age, judgment, or experience, may become a
source of danger to others; 2) where the child committing tort is acting as the servant or
agent of its parents; 3) where the parent consents, directs, or sanctions the wrongdoing;
and 4) where the parent fails to exercise control over the minor child although the parent
knows or with due care should know that injury to another is possible.
Id. (citing K. C. v. A. P., 577 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
31. See id.
32. RESTATEMENT (S ECOC) OFT ORTS § 316 (1965). Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child.
This section provides:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to
prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
33. See Parsons, 504 P.2d at 1275.
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A. THE TwO-PART TEST
As written, the Restatement enunciates a two-part test to establish
parental liability. 34 The Restatement requires first that parents either
know or have reason to know that they have the ability to control their
minor child.35 Second, parents must know or should know of the neces-
sity and opportunity to exercise control over their minor child.36 To
understand the Restatement more completely, an examination of each
part of the test is essential. 37
The first part of the test concentrates on the parents' ability to
control their child.38 The comments following the Restatement suggest
that parents have a duty to exercise their ability to control their child,
assuming they have such ability, at the time the parents have the oppor-
tunity to exercise such control and when the parents know it is necessary
to do s0. 39 The comments further suggest that it is not necessary that the
actions of the child be such that they would make the child subject to
liability. 40 This would be the case if the child were so young as to be
incapable of negligence. 4 1 Also, the younger the child, the greater the
parent's ability to control the child.42 This comment suggests that the
word "ability" means the physical ability to control.43 In fact, it is often
more necessary for the parent to control the acts of the child when the
child is younger. 44 Since the youth of the child may necessitate more
control of the child by the parent, an analysis is required of the second
part of the Restatement test, the necessary element.45
The second part of the Restatement test focuses on the necessity and
opportunity to exercise parental control. 46 Here, the comments to the





39. See id. cmt. b.
40. See id. cmt. c; see also Vance v. Thomas, 716 P.2d 710, 713 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986). "The
comments to section 316 specifically state that a parent may be liable under the rule although the child
himself is not subject to liability." Vance, 716 P.2d at 713.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 cmt. c; see also Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture,
Inc., 498 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1993) (upholding a district court's determination that a two-year-old
child is of such a tender age that he or she is incapable of negligence).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 cmt. c; see also Jarboe v. Edwards, 223 A.2d 402,
404 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966). "The modern view holds that the very youth of the child is likely to give
the parent more effective ability to control the actions of the child and to make it more often necessary
to exercise it." Id.
43. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 cmt. c.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316.
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Restatement overlap.47 The comments suggest that parents should use
their ability to control their child when they have the opportunity to
exercise their control and when they know or should have known of the
necessity of doing so. 48 These elements are stated such that the elements
seem both individually important and dependent on one another to form
parental liability. 49 As such, it is not exactly clear from the Restatement
or its comments what this test really means.50
It seems as though Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, is
really a three-part test.51 The first part remains the ability to control, but
the second part may be broken into two separate parts: 1) the necessity
to control and 2) the opportunity to control. 52 The modified test would
then be whether the parents knew or should have known of the 1) ability,
2) need, and 3) opportunity to control their minor child.53
Even with the test divided into three parts, understanding it may still
be complex.5 4 Part of the complexity is determining the difference be-
tween the ability to control5 5 and the opportunity to control.5 6 Courts
that have adopted the Restatement have used the terms in a confusing
manner.5 7 Some courts have equated the term "ability" to mean physi-
cal presence, which gives parents the ability to control their child. 58 Simi-
larly, other courts have explained that the parents' absence leaves them
no opportunity to control their child.59 Therefore, following the logic of
these cases, if parents are present, they have the ability to control their
47. See id.
48. See id. cmt. b.
49. See id.
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316.
51. See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 981 (Alaska 1999) (suggesting that the Restate-
ment is not a two-part test, but rather a three-part test).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (explaining that case law does not support literal application of the three-part test).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 cmt. a. Parents are responsible for their child-
ren's conduct insofar as they have the ability to control the conduct. See id.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 cmt. b. Parents have a duty to exercise their
ability to control their children at the time when they have the opportunity to control them. See id.
57. See Campbell v. Haiges, 504 N.E.2d 200, 203 (11. App. Ct. 1987). The court stated that if the
parent is at work when the child commits an intentional tort, the parent is not able to control his or her
minor child. See id. Parents are thus not liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, if
they were not at home at the time of the alleged tort. See id. at 203. But see Barth v. Massa, 558
N.E.2d 528, 534-35 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Cooper v. Meyer, 365 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977), which explains that if the parents were not at home at the time of the tort, they had no
opportunity, rather than no ability, to control the conduct of their child).
58. See Campbell, 504 N.E.2d at 203; see also Basler v. Webb, 544 N.E.2d 60, 62 (I11. App. Ct.
1989). The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a cause of action since the guardians of the
child were home at the time of the incident and had the ability to control the minor child. See
Campbell, 504 N.E.2d at 203.
59. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534. The court held that since the parents were not present at the




child;60 contrarily, if the parents are not present, they did not have the
opportunity to control their child.61 To add to the confusion, another
court has suggested that absent parents have no immediate control over
their child. 62 By doing so, that court failed to address whether absent
parents lacked the opportunity, or lacked the ability, to control their
minor child. 63 It may be that the terms "opportunity" and "ability"
are so closely intertwined that they could possibly be combined to create
a different form of the Restatement, as opposed to combining the terms
"opportunity" and "necessity." 64
The necessity to control element of the Restatement test is also
confusing. 65 Courts require that the parents of the minor child who
commits the tortious act are aware of specific acts of conduct sufficiently
similar to place the parents on notice that such injury may occur. 66 If
parents do have such knowledge, it then becomes necessary that they
control their minor child.67 Stating the test in this way, the courts closely
link necessity with knowledge in a way that makes the knowledge
element the primary element.68
The confusion between the actual Restatement and the application
of the Restatement results in the Restatement being applied under a dif-
ferent two-part test than what is written.69 Instead of applying the written
Restatement test, courts actually look to see if parents had knowledge
that their child's conduct could foreseeably cause the harm at issue.70
The courts then determine whether parents had the opportunity to con-
trol their child's actions. 7 1 An analysis of how the test is applied may
provide some guidance in determining the status of parental liability.
60. See Basler, 544 N.E.2d at 62.
61. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534.
62. See Seibert v. Morris, 32 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Wis. 1948). The court explained that since the
father was out of town and had no immediate control of the situation when his child committed the act,
there were no grounds for imposing liability. See id.
63. See id.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
65. See id.
66. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534 (explaining that establishing negligence under the Restatement
requires a showing "that the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to
put them on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur"); see also Kosrow v. Smith, 514
N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (II1. App. Ct. 1987) (suggesting that parental liability under the Restatement arises
when a complaint alleges "specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put the parents on notice
that the act complained of was likely to occur").
67. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534.
68. See generally Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 987, 981 (Alaska 1999). Instead of looking
for the elements of the Restatement test, the courts first examine whether the parents had knowledge
of their child's past conduct similar to that at issue to put the parents on notice. See id.
69. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (providing a two-part test for parental
liability), with Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534 (applying only the knowledge and opportunity elements of the
Restatement).
70. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534.
71. See id.
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B. APPLICATION OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, SECTION
316
The confusion generated by the Restatement is even more evident
when reviewing the case law from states that have adopted the Restate-
ment test in determining parental liability. 72 Alaska has recently re-
viewed the complexity surrounding the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 316, in the 1999 case of Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord.73 A juvenile
named Brian Hall murdered Mickey Dinsmore. 74 The relatives of the
victim and his estate (collectively known as Dinsmore) brought a wrong-
ful death suit against various people, including the parents of Brian Hall
(collectively known as the Alvords), claiming liability based on negligent
supervision.75 The lower court granted summary judgment to the
Alvords through the application of the Restatement test.76 The Supreme
Court of Alaska declined to address whether Alaska should adopt the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316.77 However, in an effort to
determine whether the grant of summary judgment was appropriate, the
Alaska Supreme Court examined out-of-state precedent. 78
The Alaska Supreme Court specifically analyzed case law from
states that adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316.79 The
court noted that instead of applying the three-part test, most courts first
ask whether the parents of the minor child "knew of past conduct
enough like that at issue to put them on notice of the need to correct
72. See Dinsmore-Poff, 972 P.2d at 981 (stating that the case law does not bear out the three-part
test).
73. 972 P.2d 978, 981 (Alaska 1999).
74. See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 979 (Alaska 1999).
75. See id. at 980. The victim's relatives also filed a wrongful death suit against his companion
who was with him at the time of the murder, the Anchorage Police Department, Hall's probation
officer, the Alaskan Youth Corrections, and Hall's parents. See id. The court dismissed a vicarious
liability claim against Hall's parents, and Dinsmore amended the complaint to allege negligent super-
vision. See id. Hall's parents successfully moved for summary judgment, and Dinsmore appealed.
See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 981.
The parties have agreed that [section] 316 is the law of the case; thus they have made
the determination the [section] 316 should apply between them. In view of their agree-
ment, we see no need either to adopt or reject [section] 316. The issue must slumber
until awakened by parties who present us with adversarial expressions of 'reason, policy,
and precedent' for or against adoption of [section] 316.
See id.
78. See id. (considering the Alvord's claim that they were entitled to judgment by reviewing out-
of-state precedent on section 316 and determining how to apply the rule).
79. See id. (citing Robertson v. Wentz, 232 Cal. Rptr. 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Gellner v.




their child's dangerous propensity."80 If a court finds that the parents
had knowledge of past similar conduct, then the court generally deter-
mines whether the parents had the opportunity or ability to control their
child.81 However, neither similar conduct nor opportunity and ability to
control one's minor child are easily defined.
1. Similar Conduct Analysis
A similar conduct standard is somewhat perplexing because the
boundaries have not been clearly defined. 82 However, the Restatement
has been interpreted narrowly. 83 For liability to attach, parents of the
minor who committed the intentional tort must have knowledge of their
child's propensity to commit such acts.84 This knowledge is predicated
on prior specific acts of the child.85
If the child has committed the same act before, then it is highly
likely that a court will determine that the parents have actual knowledge
of prior specific acts sufficient to justify imposing liability.86 However,
in situations in which a child's prior bad acts are not identical to the
intentional tort committed, courts have held that the parents were not put
on notice. 87 For example, in 1973, the Arizona Supreme Court consid-
ered Parsons v. Smithey,a8 in which the defendant parents had knowl-
edge that their son once threatened a strange woman that he would throw
rocks at her if she did not remove her clothes. 89 Their son later entered
a woman's home and beat her over the head with a hammer in an effort
to force her to take off her clothes. 90 The court determined at trial that,
looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,91 there
was insufficient evidence to send the issue of parental knowledge of their
80. Id.
81. See id. (explaining that the courts generally determine whether the parents made some effort
to prevent a recurrence).
82. See Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that a parent
should not be held liable for either behavior that is not reasonably foreseeable or for general
incorrigibility).
83. See Kohn v. Ross, No. CO-97-198, 1997 WL 423579, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining
that the duty of a parent to control the conduct of a child is narrow and arises when parents have both
the opportunity and the ability to control their child).
84. See Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528, 534 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that to establish
liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, the plaintiffs must show both that the




87. See generally Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Ariz. 1973).
88. 504 P.2d 1272 (Ariz. 1973).
89. See Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ariz. 1973).
90. See id. at 1273.
91. See id. at 1277 (including all evidence offered by the plaintiffs, either admitted or excluded).
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child's propensity to commit such acts to the jury. 92 The court stated
that "[U]nder no view of the evidence is it proper to conclude Mr. and
Mrs. Smithey should have reasonably foreseen that [their son] had a
disposition to perform such a violent act." 93
Similarly, in 1995 the Indiana Court of Appeals determined in Wells
v. Hickman94 that the defendant parent knew her child needed psycho-
logical help and had intentionally killed a pet dog by beating it over the
head. 95 The defendant parent also had knowledge that her son previous-
ly killed a pet hamster by throwing it on the ground and that he had
commented about committing suicide. 96 The Wells court nonetheless
determined that despite this sort of behavior, it was not reasonably fore-
seeable that the child would beat a neighborhood friend to death while
they played together.97 The Wells court noted that since these boys had
previously played together without incident, neither the victim nor the
harm inflicted upon the victim was foreseeable, and the parents therefore
were not liable. 98
In 1955, the Florida Supreme Court in Gissen v. Goodwill99 deter-
mined that the defendant parents knew of their child's propensity to
strike the employees of the hotel where the family resided. 100 However,
this knowledge was insufficient to place the parents on notice that their
child would sever an employee's finger by slamming a door on the
employee's hand.lOl The court suggested that an assessment of parental
liability should occur when the child has a habit of engaging in the
particular act that causes the injury.10 2 Since it was not claimed that the
child had a propensity to slam doors in an attempt to harm others, it did
not appear as though the injury sustained was a result of the parent's
negligence. 103
A 1985 Florida Supreme Court case upheld this same narrow
interpretation of the exception to parental liability by affirming an order
directing a verdict for the defendants whose son struck another child
with a croquet mallet. 104 The court explained that since it was not
alleged that the defendant's minor child had ever previously engaged in
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. 657 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
95. See Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. (citing Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Ariz. 1973)).
99. 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
100. See Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701, 702 (Fla. 1955).
101. See id. at 705.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 705-06.
104. See Snow v. Nelson, 475 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam).
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the particular act of swinging a croquet mallet in an attempt to injure
others, the trial court was correct in directing a verdict for the defen-
dants.105 The plaintiffs in that case, however, argued that applying the
exception to parental liability so narrowly created an unjust result.lO6
Despite plaintiffs argument, the court saw no reason to depart from this
narrow exception.' 07
In Dinsmore-Poff, Brian Hall's parents knew their son was emotion-
ally disturbed and was prone to uncontrollable violence.108 Brian's
parents also knew that he was involved in a shooting incident in which he
used a stolen gun to shoot another boy in the hand during an altercation
only twenty-one months prior to the murder. 109 However, the Alaska
Supreme Court found this evidence insufficient to place the Alvords on
notice of the need to intervene in order to protect the victim from any
imminent or foreseeable harm. 10 The Dinsmore-Poff court held "that a
plaintiff must show more than a parent's general notice of a child's
dangerous propensity.""'l Instead, "a plaintiff must show that the par-
ent had reason to know with some specificity of a present opportunity
and need to restrain the child to prevent some imminently foreseeable
harm."' 1 2 The Dinsmore-Poff court also rejected an argument that the
Alvords should have known that their son had a gun because they had a
duty to search his possessions periodically."l 3
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that most courts
resolve the parental knowledge issue in the parent's favor by finding
either that there was not similar past conduct or, if there was similar past
conduct, the parents did not have knowledge of such misconduct.114
However, if a court determines that the parents did have knowledge of
their child's dangerous propensities based on past similar conduct, the
court will next determine whether the parents made a reasonable attempt
105. See id.
106. See id. (arguing that the narrow application works an injustice); see also Snow, 475 So. 2d at
227 (Ehrlich, J., concurring). "[Wihere parents have actual or constructive notice of their offspring's
propensity to commit a general class of malicious acts, the child's creativity in developing new ways to
bring about injury should not absolve parents from the duty to attend to and discipline the child." Id.
107. See Snow, 475 So. 2d at 226.
108. See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 979 (Alaska 1999).
109. See id.
110. See id. at 987.
111. Id. at 986.
112. Id. (stating that knowledge of past misconduct is insufficient for parental liability).
113. See id. at 987. "Even if a plaintiff could show no reason that the parents should have known
of a specific need to control the child, the plaintiff could almost always posit some stricter regime of
discipline and surveillance under which the parents might have discovered that need." Id.
114. See id. at 981.
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to prevent another occurrence by examining the opportunity and ability
to control elements of the Restatement test.115
2. Parental Opportunity and Ability to Control
Generally, once a court finds parental knowledge of past miscon-
duct, it will examine whether the parents had the opportunity and ability
to control their minor child. 116 Generally, at this stage of its analysis, the
court has not yet made a demanding, detailed inquiry."l 7 In analyzing
the opportunity and ability to control elements, courts usually ask only if
the parents made some reasonable effort to prevent a recurrence. 118
These types of cases can often be grouped into one of four categories:
1) cases reversing dismissals under Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or
its equivalent; 2) cases finding parents liable; 3) cases finding that
parents made adequate disciplinary efforts; and 4) cases in which the
parents had no opportunity to prevent the harm.119
A 12(b)(6) dismissal or its equivalent is based upon a failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, reversal of such a
dismissal only determines that there was a claim upon which relief can be
granted and will not necessarily determine whether parents are liable,
making such cases less instructive for purposes of this analysis. 120
However, the other three categories are important to this note: cases in
the court finds the parents liable, where the court exonerates parents who
made adequate efforts at disciplining their child, or when the court
exonerates those parents who did not have the chance to prevent the
harm.121 The opinions finding parental liability are often based upon a
parent's actual knowledge, or encouragement, of a child's dangerous
propensities.122 Further, the opinions finding adequate discipline
illustrate that courts are generally lenient when it comes to determining
the reasonableness of parents' efforts to correct a vicious child.123
Finally, those opinions that exonerate parents who did not have the
chance to prevent the harm rely on an inability to control their child at
the time the crime was committed. 124
115. See generally id. at 982.
116. See REsTATFmENT (Suco'D) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
117. See Dinsmore-Poff, 972 P.2d at 982.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Cf. FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(6).
121. See id.
122. See id. (citing Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 604 P.2d 79 (Kan. Ct. App. 1974)).
123. See id. Courts have been far from demanding in judging the reasonableness of parental




As discussed earlier, the courts that adopted the Restatement test
have used the terms "opportunity" and "ability" interchangeably. 125
Some courts equate "ability" with physical presence, thereby giving
parents the ability to control their child whenever they are present,126 and
other courts similarly explain that the parents' absence leaves them no
"opportunity" to control their child.1 27  Therefore, if parents are
present, it is likely that a court may find they had the ability to control
their child, 128 whereas if the parents are not present, they did not have the
opportunity to control their child. 129 Still other courts simply have not
addressed whether an absent parent lacked opportunity or lacked the
ability to control his or her minor child.130
The courts may possibly be leaning towards holding parents harm-
less for the torts of their minor children. Since minors closer to age
eighteen generally commit the more heinous intentional torts, there has
been a reluctance to impose parental liability for an inability to control
serious conduct in their older children.'131 At least three state supreme
courts have declined to adopt the Restatement test as a source for paren-
tal liability in situations where a teenage child has committed a serious
crime such as rape or murder. 132 As one court says, "The opinions
rejecting [section] 316 may thus reflect at least in part a judicial dis-
inclination to hold parents liable for being unable to stop serious
delinquency in older children."133 It is likely that the transformation
125. See Campbell v. Haiges, 504 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987). If the parent is at work
when the child commits an intentional tort, the parent is not able to control his or her minor child. See
id. Parents are not liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, if they were not at home at
the time of the alleged tort. See Campbell, 504 N.E.2d at 203. But see Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d
528, 534-35 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Cooper v. Meyer, 365 N.E.2d 201, 203 (I11. App. Ct. 1977),
which explains that if the parent was not at home at the time of the tort, he or she had no opportunity,
rather than no ability, to control the conduct of the child).
126. See Campbell, 504 N.E.2d at 203; see also Basler v. Webb, 544 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Il1. App. Ct.
1989). The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a cause of action since the guardians of the
child were home at the time of the incident and had the ability to control the minor child. See
Campbell, 504 NE.2d at 203.
127. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534. The court held that since the parents were not present at the
time their son shot the police officer, the parents never had the opportunity to prevent the shooting.
See id.
128. See Basler, 544 N.E.2d at 62.
129. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534.
130. See Seibert v. Morris, 32 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Wis. 1948). The court explained that since the
father was out of town and had no immediate control of the situation when his child committed the act,
there were no grounds for imposing liability. See id.
131. See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 981 (Alaska 1999).
132. See id. (citing Lanterman v. Wilson, 354 A.2d 432, 433 (Md. 1976) (declining to apply sec-
tion 316 to a burglary committed by a 19-year-old); J.L. v. Kienenberger, 848 P.2d 472, 474 (Mont.
1993) (refusing to adopt section 316 in a rape case involving a 13-year-old); Rodriguez v. Spencer,
902 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting section 316 in a 17-year-old, hate-crime
murder); Bell v. Hudgins, 352 S.E.2d 332, 333 (Va. 1987) (declining to apply section 316 to an assault
and attempted rape committed by a 16-year-old)).
133. Dinsmore-Poff, 972 P.2d at 981.
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the Restatement has taken through its application in current case law has
led the way for the courts' disinclination to adopt it as the basis for
holding parents liable for the intentional acts of their minor children. 134
C. A POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE RESTATEMENT
One solution to the problem of the misinterpreted or misapplied
Restatement test may be a revision. 135 A possible revised test may
inquire first whether the parents either knew or should have known of
the necessity to control their minor child, and second, whether the
parents had the ability and opportunity to control their minor child. 136
This proposal would change the three-part test enunciated in Dinsmore-
Poff back to a two-part test. 137 However, it would also change the
original two-part test to a more plausible test by accenting the knowledge
portion of the necessity-to-control element and by combining the
opportunity and ability elements into one part.138 This revised two-part
test comports with the test applied by many courts that have adopted the
Restatement. 139
. The first branch of the revision, requiring that the parents either
know or should have known of the necessity to control their minor child,
may be analyzed by looking to prior specific acts of the minor child.140
This change would make the Restatement comport with current case
law. 14 1 Assuming that a court finds conduct sufficiently similar to that at
issue to place the parents on notice, it could move to the second branch
of the revised test.142
The second branch of the revision would clarify the confusion
surrounding the terms "opportunity" and "ability" by combining
134. See generally id.
135. Cq. id. at 981 (suggesting that the Restatement is not applied as it is written).
136. Cf. id. at 981-82. (suggesting that the Restatement is applied first by looking for parental
knowledge and second by looking to see if parents made an effort at preventing a recurrence).
137. Cf. id. at 981 (suggesting that the three-part written test is applied as a separate two-part
test).
138. Compare REsTAT.MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) (enunciating a two-part test), with
Dinsmore-Poff, 972 P.2d at 981 (explaining a different two-part application of the Restatement).
139. See Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Il. App. Ct. 1990). Establishing negligence under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316 requires that the plaintiffs show both that the parents
were aware of specific instances of prior conduct adequate to put the parents on notice and that the
parents had the opportunity to control their child. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534; see also Parsons v.
Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1275, 1277 (Ariz. 1973) (adopting the Restatement and then applying a
negligence standard predicated upon parental knowledge).
140. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534 (explaining that establishing negligence under the Restatement
requires that the plaintiffs show the parents were aware of specific instances of prior conduct
adequate to put the parents on notice).
141. See id. (applying parental knowledge as a threshold question).
142. See id. (discussing that establishing negligence under the Restatement requires both parental
knowledge and the opportunity to control the child).
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them into one distinct element.143 Opportunity would refer to the par-
ents' physical presence, while ability would refer to whether the parents
had the means or physical ability to control their child.144 The revised
Restatement test would hold parents liable if they knew, or should have
known from prior specific acts, that their child had a dangerous proclivi-
ty to commit such intentional acts, and if the parents were present and
had the means or physical ability to control their minor child. 145 Such a
revision would relieve any confusion surrounding the current Restate-
ment and would synchronize the Restatement and case law. 146 However,
many states have also added to the development of parental liability by
enacting state statutes making parents liable for damages caused by the
willful, malicious, intentional, or unlawful acts of their minor children. 147
IV. STATE STATUTES CREATING PARENTAL LIABILITY
Some states have enacted statutes that impose liability on the parents
of minor children when their child willfully or maliciously destroys real
or personal property. 148 The enactment of such statutes raises two more
143. See id. The Barth court left out the ability element in the second part of the test it applied.
See id.
144. See Campbell v. Haiges, 504 N.E.2d 200, 203 (I11. App. Ct. 1987). The court stated that if
the parent is at work when the child commits an intentional tort, the parent is not able to control his or
her minor child. See id. But see Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528, 534-35 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (citing
Cooper v. Meyer, 365 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), which explains that if the parent was not at
home, he or she had no opportunity, rather than no ability, to control the conduct of the child at the
time of the tort).
145. Cf. Lavin v. Jordon, No. OIAO-9709-CV-00455, 1998 WL 557653, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 2, 1998). The Tennessee Court of Appeals applied section 37-10-103 of the Tennessee Code An-
notated, which is similar to the proposed revision to the Restatement. See Lavin, 1998 WL 557653, at
*1 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-103). The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that parents may be
held liable when:
1) the parent has opportunity and ability to control the child, and 2) the parent has
knowledge, or in the exercise of due care should have knowledge, of the child's habit,
propensity or tendency to commit specific wrongful acts, and 3) the specific acts would
normally be expected to cause injury to others, and 4) the parent fails to exercise
reasonable means of controlling or restraining the child.
Id. at *7.
146. See generally id. (suggesting a different parental liability standard from the current
Restatement).
147. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 123 (1987).
148. See N.D. CEr. CoDE § 32-03-39 (1996). The code provides:
Parental responsibility for minor children-Recovery limitations.
Any municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or department of the
state of North Dakota, or any person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company,
association, or religious organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be
entitled to recover damages in a civil action in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any minor, living with a
parent, who shall maliciously or willfully destroy property, real, personal, or mixed, be-
longing to such municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or department of
the state of North Dakota, or person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company,
association, or religious organization.
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questions, the first concerning their constitutionality and the second
about their validity and structure. First, parental liability statutes have
generally been upheld against constitutional attack.149 Second, those
states that have enacted parental liability statutes have followed the same
general form. 150 However, it is not clear whether parental liability
statutes will severely limit recovery or expressly expand recovery by
including or excluding such things as personal injury, medical expenses,
or pain and suffering.151 The following sections address these issues and
questions.
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Parental liability statutes have generally been upheld as consti-
tutional;152 however, there are cases that have held to the contrary.I5 3
The main constitutional argument opposing parental liability statutes
asserts that they violate substantive due process under either a particular
state constitution or the Constitution of the United States.15 4 In Corley v.
Recovery shall be limited to actual damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars, in addition to taxable court costs.
See id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. §9-25-102 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West 1997);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1987 & Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.765 (1997).
149. See Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Many states have
parental liability statutes, and the weight of authority favors a finding of constitutionality. See id.
150. See B. C. Rickets, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Making Parents Liable
for Torts Committed by Their Minor Children, 8 A.L.R.3d 612 § 1(a) (1966). While revealing some
variation in language, these parental liability statutes are substantially similar in their tenor and effect.
See id.
151. See ARtz. REV. STAT. § 12-661 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); see also CAL.Civ. CODE § 1714.1
(West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (1998
& Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West 1985 & Supp. 1999); S.D. CoDM LAws
§ 25-5-15 (Michie 1999).
152. See Stang, 415 So. 2d at 124.
153. See generally Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ga. 1971) (holding that parental lia-
bility statutes violate due process of law); see also Owens v. Ivey, 525 N.Y.S.2d 508, 516 (1988) (hold-
ing that New York's parental liability statute violated the United States Constitution, Article I, § 10
because it is, in intent and in effect, a bill of attainder). The Owens court explained:
[While legislating a monetary penalty for a parent on account of damage caused by the
deliberate and malicious acts of his child may have a sound rational basis in history, and
in logic, as an effective deterrent, or preventive threat, and thereby pass muster in the
face of a constitutional challenge on due process or equal protection grounds, such a
statute does pose, at once, the question of whether it is, in essence, a forbidden bill of
attainder-particularly where, as here, the sole basis for the liability is the blood
relationship, or its legal equivalent, of parent and child.
For, it is one thing, constitutionally, to predicate vicarious tort liability on a consensual, at
will, economic relationship; but quite another, to predicate such liability solely on the
blood relationship of parent and child.
Owens, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (1988).
154. See generally Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). The Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas rejected the argument that a statute making parents liable for the willful
destruction of property by minors violates the right to due process enumerated in either the Constitution
of Texas or the Constitution of the United States. See id.
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Lewless,155 the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a parental liability
statute as unconstitutional.1 56 The court stated that "to allow any
recovery on the basis stated by the statute would deprive the defendant
of property without due process of law, would authorize a recovery
without liability, and would compel payment without fault."157 Howev-
er, eleven years later the Georgia Supreme Court found a revised version
of the parental liability statute to be constitutional.
158
To meet the requirements of substantive due process, a state statute
must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and the means utilized
to achieve the statute's goal must have a real and substantial relation to
the object sought to be obtained.' 59 In Stang v. Waller, 160 the District
Court of Appeals of Florida analyzed the constitutionality of a Florida
statute that imposed strict vicarious liability upon parents when their
minor child willfully destroyed the property of another.161 The Stang
court held that enacting a statute intended to reduce juvenile delinquen-
cy by imposing parental liability is neither arbitrary, unreasonable, nor
capricious.162 The court further held that the state had a legitimate
interest in controlling juvenile delinquency, and there was a rational
relationship between imposing liability upon parents and controlling
155. 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971).
156. See Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ga. 1971). The parental liability statute
"contravenes the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions." Id. The statute at issue
provided:
Every parent or other person in loco parentis having the custody and control over a
minor child or children under the age of 17 shall be liable for the willful and wanton acts
of said minor child or children resulting in death, injury or damage to the person or
property, or both, of another. This section shall be cumulative and shall not be restrictive
of any remedies now available to any person, firm or corporation for injuries or damages
arising out of the acts, torts or negligence of a minor child under the 'family-purpose car
doctrine' or any statutes now in force and effect in the State of Georgia.
Id. at 768.
157. Id. (quoting Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 10 S.E.2d 46, 51 (Ga. 1940)). But
see Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (suggesting that the Supreme Court
of Georgia subsequently found the statute constitutional). Since the decision in Corley, the General
Assembly of Georgia changed the intent of the statute from compensating victims for the conduct of
children to aid in controlling juvenile delinquency and also limited the amount of liability imposed. See
Stang, 415 So. 2d at 124.
158. See Hayward v. Ramick, 285 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1982). The General Assembly passed a
new parental liability statute with the express intent to aid in controlling juvenile delinquency as
opposed to compensating victims. See id. at 698. The court held that the statute intended aid in
reducing juvenile delinquency by imposing parental liability and that the statute was neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. See id. at 699. The court further held that the state had a legitimate state
interest in the subject and that the law was rationally related to that interest. See id.
159. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
160. 415 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
161. See Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
162. See id.
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juvenile delinquency.163 Accordingly, the District Court of Appeals of
Florida found the statute constitutional.164
Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Alber v. Nolle165
held that a parental liability statute was sustainable as a proper exercise
of police power if the statute was "reasonably necessary to prevent
manifest evil or reasonably necessary to preserve the public safety or
general welfare."166 The court further held that a proper exercise of
police power was not a violation of due process even though it may
affect private property.167 The New Mexico Court of Appeals thus held
that New Mexico's parental liability statute did not violate a parent's due
process property rights.168 The Alber court determined that making par-
ents liable for the willful torts of their minor children was not a violation
of due process because the legislature was acting within the scope of its
authority and the liability conformed with the legislative intent of
reducing juvenile delinquency or preserving the public safety.169
Therefore, a parental liability statute would withstand a due process
challenge if the state legislature, in enacting the statute, was not acting
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously and if the statute was a reasona-
ble way of achieving a legitimate state goal. 170 North Dakota's parental
liability statute has no accompanying legislative history. 171 Therefore, it
is not clear whether North Dakota's parental liability statute would be
considered constitutional. However, the constitutionality of parental
liability statutes has been comprehensively treated on a number of
occasions, and well-reasoned authority suggests that such statutes are
constitutional.172 Furthermore, those states that have enacted parental
liability statutes have followed the same general form. 173 Because these
statutes have followed the same general form, and since the greater
weight of authority suggests that parental liability statutes of that form
163. See id.
164. See i.
165. 645 P.2d 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)
166. See Alber v. Nolle, 645 P.2d 456, 461 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (citing State v. Dennis, 454 P.2d
276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969), which explained that a state statute is a proper exercise of police power
only if the enactment is reasonably necessary to preserve the public welfare).
167. See id&
168. See id. at 462.
169. See id. at 461-62.
170. See generally Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
171. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1997). For the text of section 32-03-39, see supra note
148.
172. See Stang, 415 So. 2d at 124.
173. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a). While there is some variation in language from state to
state, parental liability statutes generally have substantially similar effects. See Rickets, supra note
150, § 1 (a).
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are constitutional, North Dakota's parental liability statute also likely
would be considered constitutional.1
74
Most of the states that have enacted parental liability statutes have a
general stated purpose of curbing juvenile delinquency, vandalism, and
malicious mischief.175 Almost all of the statutes identify those classes of
individuals, including corporations, organizations, individuals, and politi-
cal subdivisions, as having the right to be plaintiffs.176 They generally
require that the minor child live with the parent and also usually set the
maximum dollar amount that can be recovered from the parents in a
civil action for damages.177 The maximum amount, however, varies
significantly from state to state. 178
There are different schools of thought surrounding the reasons for
creating such statutes. 179 One view is that it is better to make the parents
of a young tortfeasor liable to compensate a victim for damages than it is
to let the loss fall upon the innocent victim.180 Another view is that these
types of statutes are enacted because of dissatisfaction with the common
law rule of liability and may be an effort to assist in curbing juvenile
delinquency, vandalism, and malicious mischief.181 A third, but related,
view is that the state legislatures intended to impose a penalty upon the
parents of destructive children, rather than intending to compensate the
injured party.' 8 2 With those differing schools of thought, the extent or
scope of liability imposed under state parental liability statutes varies.
B. SCOPE OF PARENTAL LIABILITY STATUTES
In addition to constitutional concerns, parental liability statutes also
face the hurdle of strict construction. Statutes that are in derogation of
the common law must be strictly construed.183 Thus, since parental
174. Compare Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a) (suggesting that parental liability statutes are
substantially similar), with Stang, 415 So. 2d at 124 (explaining that well-reasoned authority suggests
that parental liability statutes are constitutional).
175. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a).
176. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a).
177. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a).
178. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (explaining that liability shall
not exceed $10,000 for each tort); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1998) (explaining that
liability shall not exceed $25,000). Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1996) (explaining that
liability shall not exceed $1,000).
179. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a).
180. See Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). State legislatures have
decided that it is better that the parents of the tortfeasor bear the loss instead of the victim. See id.
181. See Sutherland v. Roth, 407 So. 2d 139, 140 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (citing Rickets, supra note
150, § 1(a)).
182. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1 (a).
183. See Sutherland, 407 So. 2d at 140. "Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed and are presumed not to alter the common law in any manner not expressly declared." Id.
(citing Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1977)).
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liability statutes are generally a derogation of the common law tradition
against parental liability, they also must be strictly construed.I 8 4 Strict
construction of these statutes may result in parental liability for personal
injuries inflicted by a minor child 185 or result in no liability for personal
injuries.1 86 To determine whether these results truly conform to the
basic intentions of the individual state legislature in enacting such
statutes, an analysis of a few individual state statutes is required. 187
Some state parental liability statutes specifically provide any person
the right to recover from the parents for personal injuries sustained by a
willful or malicious act of a minor child.188 For example, Idaho allows
recovery of economic expenses, including medical expenses; however,
Idaho's statute specifically excludes recovery for less tangible damages,
such as pain and suffering and wrongful death. 189 New Mexico's paren-
tal liability statute, contrarily, has been interpreted to include pain and
suffering as recoverable damages.190 California's and Massachusetts'
parental liability statutes specifically allow recovery when the willful
misconduct of the minor results in an injury or death to afnother
184. See id.
185. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (including injury to the
person).
186. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1996) (covering all property, whether real, personal, or
mixed).
187. See City of Dickinson v. Thress, 290 N.W. 653, 656 (N.D. 1940) (stating that legislative
intent must be sought first in the language of the statute itself and that it must be presumed that the
legislature intended what it expressly stated).
188. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-661 (imposing parental liability for a child's willful act which
results in any injury to the person); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15 (Lexis 1999). "Any person
... suffering damages to real, personal or mixed property, or personal injury, through the malicious
and willful act or acts of a minor child ... shall have therefor a cause of action against and recover of
the parents of such child .... " S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-572 (West 1991) (allowing for recovery from parents when a minor willfully or maliciously causes
injury to any person).
189. See IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (1993); see also Fuller v. Studer, 833 P.2d 109, 112 (Idaho 1992).
[T]he Idaho Legislature recognized that it is contrary to public policy to hold parents
vicariously liable for the torts of their children by enacting IDAHO CODE § 6-210. This
section holds parents liable for economic losses 'willfully caused' by a minor child still
living with the parents, but only up to a maximum of $2,500. Subsection (2) of the statute
disallows recovery for 'less tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death,
or emotional distress.' The effect of this statute is to prohibit imposing vicarious liability
upon the parents for a child's negligent conduct.
See Fuller, 833 P.2d at 112.
190. See Alber v. Nolle, 645 P.2d 456, 463 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that pain and suffering
is recoverable under the parental liability statute), see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (Michie
1997).
Any person may recover damages not to exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000) in a civil
action in a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction from the parent, guardian or
custodian having custody and control of a child when the child has maliciously or
willfully injured a person or damaged, destroyed or deprived use of property, real or
personal, belonging to the person bringing the action.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27.
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person.191 Thus, strictly construing each parental liability statute will
either severely limit recovery or expressly expand recovery by either
including or excluding such things as personal injury, medical expenses,
or pain and suffering.192
Most of these statutes impose strict liability on parents for the
intentional acts of their minor children. 193 For example, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held that its parental liability statutes make parents
absolutely liable. 194 In addition, a Florida court determined that the
state's parental liability statute imposes strict vicarious liability upon
parents for their minor children's malicious or willful destruction of
property.195 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals determined that the Texas
parental liability statute does not require a showing of knowledge by the
parent for liability to attach. 196 Arizona has statutorily enacted that the
child's willful misconduct will be imputed to the parents whether or not
such parents or guardian could have anticipated the misconduct.197
Therefore, it reasonably may be inferred from the foregoing dis-
cussion that parental liability statutes generally create strict liability for
parents. 198 Interestingly, such a statutory enactment imposes parental
liability in direct contradiction to the Restatement, since the Restatement
imposes liability only if parents have knowledge of their child's
propensity to commit the act at issue. 199 Accordingly, under parental
liability statutes, parents may be strictly liable for damages to real and
personal property, and possibly for personal injuries up to the maximum
amount allowed under the respective state statute.200
IV. THE STATUS OF PARENTAL LIABILITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
The common law; the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316,
and North Dakota's parental liability statute, North Dakota Century
191. See CAL CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West
1985).
192. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-661; see also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.1; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-572; IDAHO CODE § 6-210; MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15.
193. See Memorial Lawn Cemeteries Ass'n, v. Carr, 540 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Okla. 1975) (ex-
plaining that section 10 of title 23 of the Oklahoma statute makes parents absolutely liable because no
negligence of the parents needs to be shown).
194. See id.
195. See Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 123-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
196. See Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). The court held that there
was no requirement of knowledge, nor should one be read into the statute. See id.
197. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-661.
198. See Memorial Lawn Cemeteries Ass'n, 540 P.2d at 1158; see also Stang, 415 So. 2d at
123-24; Kelly, 346 S.W.2d at 437.
199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
200. See ARIZ. R EV. STAT. § 12-661; see also CAL. C v. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G
(West 1985); S.D. CODnIFED LAWS § 25-5-15 (Lexis 1999).
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Code section 32-03-39, all play an important role in determining the
status of parental liability in North Dakota. The common law tradition
that parents are not liable for the acts of their minor children has been
codified in North Dakota.201 North Dakota has not specifically adopted
the Restatement test; however, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
applied a parental liability test similar to other courts' interpretations of
the Restatement.20 2 Finally, the extent of liability imposed under North
Dakota's parental liability statute, North Dakota Century Code section
32-03-39, has yet to be defined.203
A. COMMON LAW CODIFIED
The common law tradition that parents are not liable for the acts of
their minor children has been codified in North Dakota.204 This law was
first recognized in the Dakota Revised Codes of 1877,205 and it is textual-
ly the same today in the North Dakota Century Code as it was in the
Dakota Revised Code of 1877.206 As discussed earlier, the common law
tradition of no parental liability has only been recognized by the North
Dakota Supreme Court twice, first in 1929207 and again in 1966.208 In
1929, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed parental liability in
Miller v. Kraft.20 9 Miller involved an automobile accident between the
plaintiff and the defendant's son.2 10 The Miller court explained that
under North Dakota law, parents are not answerable for the acts of their
child.211 Therefore, the defendant in Miller only could be held liable if
such liability was based on an agency or servant relationship. 212
201. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21 (1997) ("Neither parent nor child is answerable as such
for the act of the other").
202. Compare Peterson v. Rude, 146 N.W.2d 555, 557 (N.D. 1966) (suggesting that parents may
be liable if they knows their child has the disposition to do a particular act and fail to prevent a similar
incident from occurring), with Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528, 534 (II1. Ct. App. 1990) (suggesting
that a parent may be liable if he or she is aware of specific instances of prior conduct and had the
opportunity to control the child).
203. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1997).
204. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21 (1997).
205. See id.
206. See id; see also DAKOTA REvIsED CODES § 105 (1877).
207. See Miller v. Kraft, 223 N.W. 190, 191 (N.D. 1929) ("Under section 4439, C.L. 1913,
'neither parent nor child is answerable as such for the act of the other"').
208. See Peterson v. Rude, 146 N.W.2d 555, 557 (N.D. 1966) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-09-21 (1997)).
209. 223 N.W. 190 (N.D. 1929).
210. See Miller v. Kraft, 223 N.W. 190, 191 (N.D. 1929).
211. See id.
212. See id. The Miller court then proceeded to determine that the evidence did not support a ver-
dict against the defendant father under the family purpose rule for automobiles; however, a majority
of the court further determined that a new trial should be granted regarding the question of the
father's liability. See id. at 192.
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In 1966, the North Dakota Supreme Court again addressed the issue
of parental liability in Peterson v. Rude.2 13 Peterson involved an injury
to a child's eye caused by a pellet shot from an air rifle while two boys
struggled for possession of the air rifle.2 14 The Peterson court also
recognized that parents are not liable for the acts of their minor chil-
dren. 2 15 Therefore, the plaintiffs in Peterson were required to show
more than a mere relationship between the father and his child to estab-
lish liability. 216 However, the Peterson court did recognize that a parent
may still be liable for his or her own negligence.217
As shown in Miller and Peterson, the North Dakota common law
notion of no parental liability may still exist in its strictest form. The
North Dakota courts have consistently held that parental liability must be
predicated upon more than a mere parent-child relationship.2 18 Howev-
er, the requirement that something more than the parent-child relation-
ship exist for liability may be fulfilled by a parental negligence standard
founded on parental knowledge.2 19
B. THE RESTATEMENT TEST IN NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota has not specifically adopted the Restatement test.
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied a test for parental
liability that is similar to other courts' interpretation and application of
the Restatement test.220 Peterson involved a four-year old girl struck in
the eye by a pellet when some neighborhood boys struggled for posses-
sion of a pellet gun.221 The father of the boy who owned the gun was
hospitalized at the time of the incident. 222 The court determined there
was no evidence that the defendant's son had any vicious habits or was
ever negligent in using the air rifle.223 Therefore, the court held that
"the motion for judgment notwithstanding the failure of the jury to
return a verdict should have been granted as to the defendant father."224
213. 146 N.w.2d 555 (N.D. 1966).
214. See Peterson v. Rude, 146 N.W.2d 55 , 557 (N.D. 1966).
215. See id. at 557 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21 (1997)).
216. See id.
217. See id. (suggesting that parents may be liable if they know their child has the disposition to
do a particular act and fail to prevent a similar incident from occurring).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Compare Peterson v. Rude, 146 N.W.2d 555, 557 (N.D. 1966) (suggesting that parents may
be liable if they has knowledge that their child is disposed to do a particular act but fail to prevent a
similar incident from occurring), with Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990)
(suggesting that a parent may be liable if he or she is aware of specific instances of prior conduct and
had the opportunity to control the child).
221. See Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557.
222. See id. at 556.
223. See id. at 558.
224. Id.
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Peterson laid out the current test for parental liability in North
Dakota, which states that "a parent may be held liable for the wrongful
acts of his minor child if he has knowledge of the child's previous
conduct of the same character, his disposition to do the act which he is
charged with having committed, and where such parent, with such knowl-
edge, fails to take reasonable steps to avoid an incident." 225 This test is
similar to the Appellate Court of Illinois' interpretation of the Restate-
ment test in Barth.226 In Barth, the court explained that to establish liabil-
ity under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, the plaintiffs
must show that the parents were aware of specific instances of prior
conduct and that the parents had the opportunity to control the child. 227
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court may have implicitly
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316.228
Those states that have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 316, have not followed the Restatement as written and instead
have created a two-part analysis based on the parents' knowledge of
their child's propensity for malicious behavior and the parents' oppor-
tunity to control the child.229 Therefore adopting the Restatement in
North Dakota for a child's intentional tort may be of no applicable
value. 230 Since the current Restatement test is not applied as it is written,
a more appropriate approach may be to adopt an analysis similar to the
proposed revision previously set forth in this Note. Thus, parental liabili-
ty would be determined by deciding first whether the parents either knew
or should have known of the necessity to control their minor child, and
second whether the parents had the ability and opportunity to control
their minor child.231
Another approach may be to adopt the analysis in Dinsmore-
Poff.2 32 In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a four-part test
to determine whether the parents acted reasonably in light of the
225. Id. at 557.
226. Compare Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534 (suggesting that liability may attach if a parent is aware
of specific instances of prior conduct and had the opportunity to control the child), with Peterson, 146
N.W.2d at 557 (suggesting that a parent may be liable if he or she knows the child has the disposition
to do a particular act but fails to prevent a similar incident from occurring).
227. See Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534.
228. Compare Barth, 558 N.E.2d at 534, with Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557.
229. See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 981 (Alaska 1999). The text of section 316 sug-
gests a three-part analysis; however, states which have adopted the Restatement typically do not apply
that test and ask instead whether the parents had notice of their child's propensity to commit such acts.
See id.
230. Cf. Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557 (establishing a parental negligence standard).
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965) (requiring some revision from the actual
text).
232. Dinsmore-Poff, 972 P.2d at 978.
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knowledge of their child's propensity to commit such acts.233 The four
parts of this test are as follows: First, did the parents respond appropri-
ately to the specific acts of prior violence? Second, have the subsequent
efforts to control the child been reasonable? Third, should the parents
have foreseen the need to prevent this specific incident? Finally, if so,
did the parents make reasonable efforts to prevent this specific inci-
dent?234 None of the questions asked under the Alaska four-part test is
dispositive; rather, an affirmative answer to any may contribute to a
finding of parental negligence. 235 Basically, the Dinsmore-Poff test for
determining parental liability focuses on the reasonableness of the
parents' response to their child's behavior.236
Either the proposed revised Restatement test or the Alaska four-part
test from Dinsmore-Poff would provide a more understandable and work-
able parental liability standard for North Dakota. 237 Both tests provide a
standard that comports with current case law. Since parental liability is
not based solely on negligence, but also is based on strict parental
liability statutes, an analysis of North Dakota's parental liability statute is
appropriate. 238
C. NORTH DAKOTA'S PARENTAL LIABILITY STATUTE
The North Dakota Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving
section 32-03-39 of the North Dakota Century Code.239 Therefore, to
predict the statute's likely interpretation, out-of-state cases involving simi-
lar statutes must be analyzed.240 The issues surrounding this statute are
whether it will be interpreted as imposing strict liability on parents; wheth-
er it allows for the recovery of damages for personal injuries or applies





238. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1997).
239. See id. The statute states:
Parental responsibility for minor children-Recovery limitations.
Any municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or department of the
state of North Dakota, or any person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company,
association, or religious organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be
entitled to recover damages in a civil action in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any minor, living with a
parent, who shall maliciously or willfully destroy property, real, personal, or mixed, be-
longing to such municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or department of
the state of North Dakota, or person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company,
association, or religious organization.
Recovery shall be limited to actual damages in an amount not to exceed one
thousand dollars, in addition to taxable court costs.
d.
240. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39, with IND. CODE AN. § 34-31-4-1 (West 1999).
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only to property damage; and finally, whether it would preclude further
recovery in the event that the damages exceed the statutory maximum.
24 1
North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39 will likely be inter-
preted as creating strict parental liability. 242 Indiana has a parental
liability statute similar to that of North Dakota. 243 The Indiana Court of
Appeals interpreted its parental liability statute as giving rise to strict
parental liability. 244 Further, a close look at North Dakota Century Code
section 32-03-39 reveals that there is no statutorily required level of
parental culpability necessary to impose liability on the parents for their
child's willful or malicious acts. 245 Therefore, it reasonably may be
inferred that the parental liability statute for North Dakota imposes strict
liability on parents. 246
The issue then is what type of damages are covered by North
Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39.247 As written, the statute allows
recovery for willful or malicious destruction of property, real, personal,
or mixed.248 While some state parental liability statutes do allow for
recovery of personal injury, the North Dakota statutory language does
241. See generally Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 176-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (resolving
similar issues).
242. See id. at 177 (stating that IND. CODE ANN. § 34-31-4-1 which is similar to N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-03-39 makes parents strictly liable).
243. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1996)
(Any municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or department of the state
of North Dakota, or any person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company,
association, or religious organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be
entitled to recover damages in a civil action in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of any minor, living with a
parent, who shall maliciously or willfully destroy property, real, personal, or mixed,
belonging to such municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or department
of the state of North Dakota, or person, partnership, corporation, limited liability
company, association, or religious organization.
Recovery shall be limited to actual damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars, in addition to taxable court costs),
with IND. CODE ANN. § 34-31-4-1 (West 1999)
((a) As used in this section, "child" means an unemancipated person who is less than
eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) A parent is liable for not more than three thousand dollars ($3,000) in actual
damages arising from harm to a person or damage to property knowingly, intentionally,
or recklessly caused by the parent's child if:
1) the parent has custody of the child; and
2) the child is living with the parent).
244. See Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that Indiana's parental
liability statute holds a parent strictly liable for certain acts of his or her minor child).






not specifically allow recovery for personal injury. 249 North Dakota's
statute provides:
[A]ny . . . person, .... shall be entitled to recover damages in
a civil action in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars
in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of
any minor, living with a parent, who shall maliciously or will-
fully destroy property, real, personal, or mixed, belonging to
such... person .... 250
The language of the statute suggests that property damages such as
a broken window are recoverable when a child willfully throws a rock
through that window. However, it is not clear whether the statute allows
recovery for injuries when the same rock flies through an open window
and hits a person. 251
New Mexico had a parental liability statute that closely paralleled
North Dakota's current parental liability statute. 252 In Ross v. Souter,253
the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an action
brought to recover damages to orthodontic work. 254 The action was
brought against the parents of a boy who was involved in a fight with the
plaintiffs son. 255 The plaintiff sought recovery under New Mexico's
parental liability statute. 256 The court determined that damages to dental
work as a result of a fight were not the type of property that was meant
to be covered by the phrase, "property, real, personal, or mixed." 257
This phrase matches the phrase contained in North Dakota's current
parental liability statute. 258 Therefore, North Dakota's parental liability
statute likely would not cover personal injuries without some sort of
legislative amendment specifically allowing recovery for personal in-
jury. 259 Importantly, New Mexico has enacted a new parental liability
249. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-661 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (including injury to the
person), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39.
250. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39.
251. See id.
252. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-53.1 (1953) (repealed 1972) (explaining that a plaintiff
may recover damages from a parent of a minor who maliciously or willfully destroys property, real,
personal, or mixed), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (explaining that a plaintiff may recover
damages from a parent of a minor who maliciously or willfully destroys any property).
253. 464 P.2d 911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).
254. See Ross v. Souter, 464 P.2d 911,913 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).
255. See id. at 912.
256. See id.
257. See ie at 913. The court found no authority for holding that a child's teeth are property,
real, personal, or mixed. See id.
258. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-53.1 (repealed 1972) (replaced by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-
2-27 (Michie 1993)), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39.
259. See N.D. CENr. CODE § 32-03-39.
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statute that specifically allows for recovery of damages for personal
injury when a child willfully or maliciously injures a person.260
North Dakota's parental liability statute would likely make parents
strictly liable for the acts of their minor children. 261 However, case law
suggests that the text of the statute limits recovery to property damages
and not personal injury damages. 262 Interestingly, case law further sug-
gests that North Dakota's parental liability statute likely would not
preclude recovery of damages for parental negligence. 263 As such, an
analysis of the interaction between these different parental liability
standards is necessary.
D. THE INTERACTION OF NORTH DAKOTA LAW
The interaction of North Dakota law requires an analysis of how
North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39, which holds parents
strictly liable for a child's willful destruction of property, and North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-21, which holds parents harmless
for the acts of their minor children, affect one another. 264 Further, it is
important to consider how North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39
and North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-21 both interact with the
Restatement.265
1. Section 14-09-21 v. Section 32-03-39
North Dakota has two statutes that affect the realm of parental
liability. 266 It is not exactly clear how North Dakota Century Code
section 32-03-39, which holds parents strictly liable for a child's willful
destruction of property, would be interpreted in comparison to North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-21 which holds parents harmless for
the acts of their minor children. 267 Generally a statute which is contrary
to a common law principle is strictly construed.268 However, since North
Dakota enacted section 14-09-21, it is not exactly accurate to say that
260. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (Michie 1993) (allowing for personal injuries); see also
Alber v. Nolle, 645 P.2d 456, 463 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that damages for pain and suffering
are recoverable under the parental liability statute).
261. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39.
262. See Ross v. Souter, 464 P.2d 911,913 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).
263. See Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that the
parental liability statute does not preclude an action based on negligence).
264. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39.
265. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
266. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-21, 32-03-39.
267. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-21, 32-03-39.
268. See Sutherland v. Roth, 407 So. 2d 139, 140 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). "Statutes in derogation of
the common law are strictly construed and are presumed not to alter the common law in any manner
expressly declared." Id. (citing Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1977)).
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applying North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39, which is con-
trary to section 14-09-21, is a derogation of the common law. Nonethe-
less, section 14-09-21 may be considered a common law principle,
meaning the application of section 32-03-39 would probably be strictly
construed. 269
North Dakota likely would still recognize the general rule that
parents are not liable for the acts of their children.270 However, the court
may not overlook North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39.271
Most cases that have dealt with the common law notion that parents are
not liable for the torts of their minor children, while interpreting a paren-
tal liability statute, have generally recognized the common law notion of
no parental liability. 272 After recognizing this common law notion, the
courts likely will then apply the parental liability statute. 273 North
Dakota likely would follow this method of recognizing section 14-09-21
as the general law of North Dakota and would then determine, based on
the facts of the case, whether North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-
39 provides an applicable exception to the common law notion by
imposing parental liability.274
2. Section 14-09-21 v. the Restatement
While North Dakota likely will continue to recognize the general
rule that parents are not liable for the acts of their children, 275 the North
Dakota Supreme Court could not completely overlook the Restatement
exception to this general rule. 276 Since the court applied a test similar to
the Restatement tests applied by other courts which have adopted the
Restatement,277 it is probable that the North Dakota Supreme Court
would review out-of-state precedent to determine the current inter-
pretation of the Restatement.278 The North Dakota Supreme Court likely
would adopt a parental liability standard predicated upon some sort of
269. See Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("[S]tatutes in derogation of the common
law must be strictly construed").
270. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21; see also Peterson v. Rude, 146 N.W.2d 555, 557 (N.D.
1966).
271. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39.
272. See generally Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 176-77.
273. See generally id.
274. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-21, 32-03-39.
275. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-21; see also Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557.
276. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
277. See Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557. The court applied a test predicated upon parental knowl-
edge of a child's disposition to commit the act with which the child is charged and a parental failure to
act. See id.
278. See id. at 558 (looking to out-of-state case law to determine whether an air rifle is a
dangerous weapon).
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parental negligence. 279 The standard adopted would probably be more
similar to the case law interpretation of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 316 than it would be to the actual language of the
Restatement.280
3. Section 32-03-39 v. Restatement
The final interplay is that between North Dakota Century Code
section 32-03-39 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota probably will adopt either the
Restatement or a reasonable interpretation of the Restatement.281 There-
fore, the main issue when comparing these two parental liability princi-
ples is whether a case allowing recovery under North Dakota Century
Code section 32-03-39 would preclude recovery under the Restate-
ment.282 Generally, recovery under a parental liability statute does not
preclude recovery under another exception to the common law tradition
of no parental liability. 283 Thus, parents in North Dakota may be liable
above the statutory limit imposed by North Dakota Century code section
32-03-39, if the plaintiffs are able to prove that the parents failed to
control the conduct of their minor child under the interpretation of the
Restatement test that the North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately
chooses to adopt.284
Parental liability has undergone significant changes since the com-
mon law notion was codified in Dakota Revised Codes of 1877. The law
in North Dakota has only begun to develop in this area. Currently,
North Dakota has not yet expressly adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 316. However, North Dakota has enacted a parental liabili-
ty statute that is limited in scope to allow only for recovery of damages
to real or personal property. 285
North Dakota will most likely recognize section 14-09-21 as the
general law of the state.286 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
could not overlook completely the Restatement exception to this general
rule. 28 7 Theoretically, the North Dakota Supreme Court would recog-
279. See generally id. at 557 (explaining that parental negligence may create parental liability).
280. See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 981 (Alaska 1999) (explaining that case law
does not bear out the three-part test suggested by the Restatement).
281. See Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557 (applying a test similar to the Restatement).
282. See generally Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that
parental liability statute does not preclude recovery on an action based upon parental negligence).
283. See id. (suggesting that parental liability statutes do not preclude recovery on an action
based upon parental negligence).
284. See id.
285. See N.D. CtMrr. CODE § 32-03-39 (1996).
286. See Peterson, 146 N.W.2d at 557.
287. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
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nize section 14-09-21 and then determine, based on the facts of the case,
whether section 32-03-39 provides a basis for imposing parental
liability. 288 Further, the court likely would also recognize that recovery
under a parental liability statute generally does not preclude recovery
under a parental negligence theory such as the Restatement test. 289
There are two ways in which North Dakota can raise the level of
parental liability. The first avenue is through the state legislature. By
amending North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-39 to include
parental liability for personal injuries received from a child's willful or
malicious acts, North Dakota could effectively increase the level of
parental liability. The North Dakota legislature could also increase the
level of parental liability effectively by amending North Dakota Century
Code section 32-03-39 to increase the dollar amount of damages
allowed. The second way that North Dakota could increase parental
liability would be through the North Dakota State Supreme Court. By
adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316, or a version of
the Restatement test, the North Dakota Supreme Court could clarify the
extent of liability for parents in North Dakota.
V. CONCLUSION
As discussed earlier, there are three major stages in the development
of the law with respect to parental liability. 290 First, the common law
tradition purported that a mere parent-child relationship was insufficient
grounds for establishing liability,291 and therefore parents were not held
liable for the torts of their minor children. 292
Second, the Restatement exception asserts that parents may be liable
for the acts of their minor child when the parent fails to exercise control
over that child.293 Currently, many states hold parents liable should
288. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-21 (1997), 32-03-39.
289. See Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 177 (suggesting that parental liability statutes do not preclude
recovery on an action based upon parental negligence).
290. See 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 116 (1987) (discussing the common law tradition,
statutory exception, and case law development of parental liability).
291. See id. Reflecting the age of this notion, the common law tradition was that paternity was
not sufficient grounds for liability. See id. (emphasis added).
292. See id.; see also White v. Seitz, 174 N.E. 371, 372 (I. 1930) (stating that the court has held,
in accordance with the universal rule of the common law, that a parent is not liable for the tort of his
or her minor child based solely on the relationship between them); Wintercom v. Rybicki, 397 N.E.2d
485, 487 (I1. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that parents are not liable for the torts of their minor child merely
because of the parent-child relationship).
293. See Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
There are four common law exceptions to the general rule that a parent is not liable for
the tortious acts of her child: 1) where the parent entrusts the child with an instrumen-
tality which, because of the child's lack of age, judgment, or experience, may become a
source of danger to others; 2) where the child committing the tort is acting as the servant
or agent of its parents; 3) where the parent consents, directs, or sanctions the wrong
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they fail to control the conduct of their minor children under a test
established in Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 316.294 Liability
under the Restatement is predicated upon parental negligence 295 and is
delineated as a two-part test,296 although most courts apply a three-part
variation of it.297
The final stage is parental liability statutes. The constitutionality of
such statutes has been treated comprehensively on a number of occa-
sions, and well-reasoned authority suggests that such statutes should be
considered constitutional. 298 Those states that have enacted parental lia-
bility statutes have followed the same general form and effect,299 which
generally creates strict liability for the parents. 300 However, the kind and
amounts of damages recoverable vary widely from statute to statute. 301
After the Columbine massacre, the New York Times interviewed
neighbors and acquaintances of the teenage killers and their families and
described the relationship that Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold had with
their parents. 302 The article suggests that there was a fundamental discon-
nection between Eric and Dylan's lives and the lives their parents be-
lieved they were living.303 The article further suggests that the Harrises
and the Klebolds were "caring, conscientious parents who structured
their lives around supporting their children . . . and who believed, from
all accounts, that they were on the right track." 304 However, these
doing; and 4) where the parent fails to exercise control over the minor child although the
parent knows or with due care should know that injury to another is possible.
Id. (citing K. C. v. A. P., 577 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). The Restatement states:
Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as
to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control.
Id.
295. See Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ariz. 1973).
296. See RESTATEMENr (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
297. See Dinsmore-Poff, 972 P.2d at 981.
298. See Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
299. See Rickets, supra note 150, § l(a). Despite some variation in language, these parental
liability statutes are substantially similar in their tenor and effect. See Rickets, supra note 150, § 1(a).
300. See Memorial Lawn Cemeteries Ass'n v. Carr, 540 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Okla. 1975); see also
Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 123-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434,
437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
301. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-661 (West 1992); see also CAL.CIv. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1998);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 6-210 (Michie 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15 (Lexis 1999).
302. See Pam Belluck & Jodi Wilgoren, Caring Parents, No Answers, in Columbine Killers' Pasts,





parents are now involved in a multimillion dollar lawsuit, 305 in which the
parents of one child killed at Columbine allege that the Harrises and the
Klebolds failed to supervise their children. 306 Whether these parents are
liable in tort for the acts of their children is yet to be decided.
The shift from no liability to liability for negligence, and now the
creation of strict statutory liability for parents, suggests that this area of
law is still developing. The events at Columbine may provide some
insight into the future of parental liability. Colorado has recognized the
common law notion of no parental liability as well as a parental negli-
gence standard. 307 Further, Colorado does have a parental liability stat-
ute covering both property damage and personal injury. 308 Therefore,
the future of parental liability likely may be shaped by the litigation
surrounding the events at Columbine.
Jeffrey L. Skaare
305. See Court Decisions, supra note 3, at 5.
306. See id.
307. See Hall v. McBryde, 919 P.2d 910, 913 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), which states:
A parent is not liable for the torts committed by his or her child merely because of the
parent-child relationship. However, when a child has a known propensity to commit a
potentially harmful act, the parent has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent the child
from causing such harm if the parent knows or should know of the propensity and has the
ability and opportunity to control the child.
d.
308. See CoLo. REv. STAT. AN. § 13-21-107 (West 1997). The statute provides:
Damages for destruction or bodily injury caused by minors
(1) The state or any county, city, town, school district, or other political subdivision
of the state, or any person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious organiza-
tion, whether incorporated or unincorporated, is entitled to recover damages in an
amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars in a court of competent juris-
diction from the parents of each minor under the age of eighteen years, living with such
parents, who maliciously or willfully damages or destroys property, real, personal, or
mixed, belonging to the state, or to any such county, city, town, or other political subdivi-
sion of the state, or to any such person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious
organization or who maliciously or willfully damages or destroys any such property
belonging to or used by such school district. The recovery shall be the actual damages in
an amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars, in addition to court costs
and reasonable attorney fees.
(2) Any person is entitled to recover damages in an amount not to exceed three
thousand five hundred dollars in a court of competent jurisdiction from the parents of
each minor under the age of eighteen years, living with such parents, who knowingly
causes bodily injury to that person, including bodily injury occurring on property belong-
ing to or used by a school district. The recovery shall be the actual damages in an
amount not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars, in addition to court costs and
reasonable attorney fees.
* * *
